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Microaggressions are, roughly, acts or states of affairs that express prejudice or neglect toward 
oppressed group members in relatively subtle ways. Tere is an apparent consensus among both 
proponents and critics of the MICROAGGRESSION  concept that microaggressions are 
“subjective.” We examine what subjectivity amounts to in this context and argue against this 
consensus. We distinguish between microaggressions as an explanatory posit and 
microaggressions as a hermeneutical tool, arguing that in either case there is no reason at present 
to regard microaggressions as subjective, and that microaggressions in the hermeneutical sense 
should be regarded as objective. 
1. Introduction. Te microaggression  concept has received much attention—
both scholarly and popular—over the last decade. Microaggressions are, roughly, acts 
(ofen but not exclusively speech acts) that exhibit prejudice or neglect toward members
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2 MIKIO AKAGI AND FREDERICK W. GOODING, JR.
of oppressed groups, or states of affairs that exclude or denigrate members of oppressed 
groups. Tere appears to be a consensus that microaggressions are “subjective,” both 
among the concept’s scientifc proponents, such as Derald Wing Sue, and its critics, 
such as Scott O. Lilienfeld. Presumably, the claim that microaggressions are “subjective” 
means that there is no perspective-independent matter of fact regarding whether an act 
or state of affairs is a microaggression. Tat is, whether an act or state of affairs counts 
as a microaggression depends upon how it is perceived by some subject. We disagree 
with this consensus, distinguishing between “explanatory” and “hermeneutical” 
microaggression  concepts. We argue that there is no a priori reason to regard 
explanatory microaggressions as “subjective,” and that there are compelling 
phenomenological reasons to regard hermeneutical microaggressions as objective. 
2. Microaggressions and their effects. Te term “microaggression” was coined by 
African American psychiatrist Chester Pierce (1970) as a label for subtle forms of 
hostility or disdain commonly exhibited by White Americans against African 
Americans. Te term was subsequently amplifed by psychologist Derald Wing Sue and 
colleagues (Sue et al. 2007), who generalized the concept to encompass many subtle 
forms of racism. Teir of quoted gloss is that: 
Racial microaggressions are brief and commonplace daily verbal, behavioral, and 
environmental indignities, whether intentional or unintentional, that communicate 
hostile, derogatory, or negative racial slights and insults to the target person or group. 
(Sue et al. 2007, 273) 
Te term is now understood broadly, both in critical theory and in psychology, as 
including not only racial slights, but also those related to gender (Capodilupo et al. 
2010; Barthelemy et al. 2016), LGBTQ oppression (Nadal, Rivera, et al. 2010), disability 
(Keller and Galgay 2010; Gonzalez et al. 2015), socioeconomic status (Smith and 
Redington 2010), religion (Nadal, Issa, et al. 2010), or indeed any form of structural 
oppression (Sue 2010c), including intersectional forms of oppression (q.v. Crenshaw 
1989; Nadal et al. 2015; Olkin et al. 2019). A person or social group that is demeaned or 
alienated by a microaggression is called a target. For microaggressions that are acts, the 
agent of the microaggression is generally called a perpetrator or performer. 
A commonly-cited example of a verbal microaggression (e.g. in Sue 2010a;
Lilienfeld 2017) is a remark made by John McCain during his 2008 presidential
campaign against Barack Obama. A woman at a town hall event said to McCain that
    
              
       
           
       
                
         
           
        
       
            
           
             
            
 
            
             
                
    
         
           
             
              
           
            
            
             
        
          
        
        
       
 
              
             
            
          
               
       
3MICROAGGRESSIONS AND OBJECTIVITY
she doesn’t trust Obama because “He’s an Arab.” McCain replied, “No ma’am. He’s a
decent family man, citizen, that I just happen to have disagreements with on 
fundamental issues… He’s not.” McCain’s reply carries the unfortunate (and probably
unintentional) conversational implicature that being of Arab descent counts in some
way against being “a decent family man” or a “citizen.” As such, it is an ethnic
microaggression. Many microaggressions carry such implicatures, which are referred
to in the microaggression literature as hidden messages (Sue et al. 2007). One of the
challenges for researchers who generalize the microaggression concept to new
domains of oppression is the identifcation of the relevant hidden messages (Johnston
and Nadal 2010). Microaggressions can also be nonverbal acts, e.g. tightly clutching
one’s purse or crossing the street when encountering a Black man. And
microaggressions can be states of affairs, such as the persistence of a problematic
monument. Sue and colleagues (2007) call these latter states of affairs environmental
microaggressions.
Some (e.g. Greg Lukianoff and Jonathan Haidt and other critics of “campus
culture”) suggest that the proper response to microaggressions is to toughen up or
“grow a thicker skin.” As Regina Rini notes, this may be an appropriate response to mere
insults but it is an insufficient response to microaggressions because microaggressions 
are components of larger patterns of systematic oppression (2018). Te targets of
microaggressions are necessarily oppressed groups or their members. Of course slights
can target privileged social groups or their members (e.g. “White people can’t dance”),
but such slights are not called “microaggressions” because they are not likely to have
the same negative effects.1 Te relevant difference between microaggressions and other
slights is that microaggressions are congruent with oppressive systems, in Liao and
Huebner’s (2020, 10) sense, and therefore are smaller extensions of larger power
structures. Slights that target privileged social groups go against the grain of oppressive
social systems rather than being congruent with them.
Rini’s reply is underappreciated in many skeptical discussions of microaggressions,
including Lilienfeld’s (2017), which raises doubts about whether the acts called
microaggressions are always performed with malicious motivations. Performers’
motivations may be relevant for assigning blame (see Washington and Kelly 2016 for 
1 We recognize standard provisos here: individual persons can be members both of oppressed 
and privileged social groups; e.g. a wealthy queer person may experience structural disadvantage
related to their queerness but privilege related to their socioeconomic class. And oppression
ofen compounds in a non-additive manner for those who are members of multiple oppressed
social groups, e.g. Black women in the U.S. experience specifc challenges faced neither by Black
men nor by White women (Crenshaw 1989).
        
       
         
            
    
       
       
          
          
       
         
           
   
         
   
           
            
           
          
         
  
         
   
      
             
      
          
     
      
           
              
    
      
          
           
             
      
4 MIKIO AKAGI AND FREDERICK W. GOODING, JR.
discussion), but not for understanding the effects of microaggressions on their targets. 
Much of the psychological literature on microaggressions should be understood as part
of what Nyla Branscombe and colleagues call the “psychology of the historically
disenfranchised” (1999, 135, 146): empirical investigations that focus on the psychology 
of oppressed social groups rather than, like much of the implicit bias literature, the 
mental states of those who are privileged.
And it is hypothesized that the aggregate effect of microaggressions—perceived or 
otherwise—on their targets is signifcant, and not only because they cause gratuitous
pain or discomfort. Perceived discrimination regarding race, gender, and sexual
orientation predicts psychological and somatic health outcomes (Mays et al. 2007;
Carter 2007; Herek 2009). Racial gaps in health outcomes in the U.S. are not fully
explained by differences in socioeconomic status or self-esteem (Gee et al. 2007a,
2007b). Plausibly, microaggressions play a role in explaining these recalcitrant health
gaps, and many discussions of microaggressions are motivated by appeal to various 
outcome gaps (in health, academic or professional achievement, etc.). Te detailed
mechanism by which microaggressions contribute to such outcome gaps is not known
(Okazaki 2009; Torres et al. 2010), but stress seems to be a mediating factor (Harrell 
and Taliaferro 2003), complicated by in-group identifcation, which seems to have a
protective effect (Crocker and Major 1989; Branscombe et al. 1999). Te scientifc
situation is made more complicated by the multiplicity of experimental protocols 
(Sullivan 2009): since microaggression incidence is measured in a variety of ways, 
experimental inference about microaggressions is complicated in ways that are played 
down in published literature. And in some discussions, “microaggression” may
function as a catchall term referring to any manifestations of structural oppression that
are relatively difficult to measure independently.
So in the interest of promoting a little more clarity, we distinguish two
microaggression concepts. Te explanatory microaggression concept refers,
ex hypothesi, to some factor that explains recalcitrant gaps in desirable outcomes (e.g.
good health, professional success) between members of privileged and oppressed social
groups, such as those that remain afer other factors like wealth, income, and legal
discrimination are accounted for. Microaggressions in this sense may turn out to be a 
variety of diverse factors (they may be “lumpy”; see Feest 2020); we will not know
exactly what they look like until we have a more sophisticated causal understanding of
recalcitrant outcome gaps. But the term “microaggression” functions in some discourse
as a more determinate label for concrete experiences of slights and invalidations. So, let 
the hermeneutical microaggression concept be what is invoked in such contexts.
    
    
               
    
              
     
 
  
         
            
           
    
               
         
           
           
 
              
           
           
         
           
         
             
             
             
               
 
        
               
          
          
 
              
            
             
              
5MICROAGGRESSIONS AND OBJECTIVITY
Te hermeneutical microaggression concept is a hermeneutical resource (Fricker 
2007) that helps people to make sense of their lived experiences, and the popularity of
the microaggression concept outside of the behavioral and social sciences is 
probably largely due to its hermeneutical role. It is an open empirical question whether
the explanatory and hermeneutical microaggression concepts are largely
coextensive.
3. Two senses of “subjective.” So are microaggressions objective? Te answer 
depends on whether we are talking about explanatory or hermeneutical
microaggressions. But clarifcation is also in order regarding the terms “objective” and 
“subjective.” Philosophers tend to reserve the term “subjective” for propositions whose
truth values vary according to a perspective (MacFarlane 2014: a “context of 
assessment”). For example, a dress may look blue and black to me, and may look white
and gold (i.e. not-blue-and-black) to you. Tere is a perspective-independent fact about 
what color the dress is, but no such fact about how the dress looks; it looks different to
different people. Let us call such claims alethically subjective, and claims that have
perspective-independent truth values can be called alethically objective.
By contrast, in common parlance a claim is ofen said to be “subjective” if
reasonable people disagree about its truth value, even if the claim has a perspective-
independent truth value. We may call claims that are controversial in this manner
discursively subjective. Te claim that Shakespeare’s works were written by William
Shakespeare is discursively subjective—some folks believe the plays and poems were
written by someone else. But there is a perspective-independent fact of the matter about 
who wrote Shakespeare’s works, so the claim is not alethically subjective.2 Both alethic
and discursive subjectivity are properties of claims rather than concepts or words, but
for ease of expression we will talk about “microaggressions” as subjective or objective,
meaning that classifying an act or state of affairs as a microaggression is subjective or
objective.
Now, obviously claims about microaggressions can be discursively subjective— 
there is ofen disagreement about whether a particular act or state of affairs is a
microaggression. Nevertheless, it is commonly held that microaggressions are also
alethically subjective. Lilienfeld criticizes the microaggression concept on the grounds
2 Another sense of “objectivity” relevant to science is independence from values or normative
commitments, but most microaggressions research is plausibly not objective in this sense since
it presupposes a normative theory of justice and structural oppression. However, discussion of
the value-free ideal in the social sciences is beyond the scope of our argument.
        
              
       
           
           
      
             
           
      
    
       
              
    
 
              
          
            
              
 
         
          
            
         
       
      
           
            
     
            
        
            
            
       
6 MIKIO AKAGI AND FREDERICK W. GOODING, JR.
that microaggressions are thought to be “necessarily in the eye of the beholder” (2017,
143), and Sue claims that “Microaggressions are about experiential reality” (2017, 171). 
Lilienfeld regards the subjectivity of microaggressions as a source of confusion:
If Minority Group Member A interprets an ambiguous statement directed toward her 
[…] as patronizing or indirectly hostile, whereas Minority Group Member B interprets 
it as supportive or helpful, should it be classifed as a microaggression? Te
[microaggressions] literature offers scant guidance in this regard. (Lilienfeld 2017, 143)
Generally speaking, that a claim is discursively subjective does not imply that it is 
alethically subjective (e.g. the Shakespeare case above is discursively subjective but not
alethically subjective). So even if there is reasonable disagreement about whether a
particular act or state of affairs is a microaggression, that does not imply that the
microaggression is alethically subjective.
Lilienfeld continues:
it is unclear whether any verbal or nonverbal action that a certain proportion of
minority individuals perceive as upsetting or offensive would constitute a
microaggression. Nor is it apparent what level of agreement among minority group
members would be needed to regard a given act as a microaggression. (Lilienfeld 2017,
143)
Such questions are unmotivated. No serious proponent of the microaggression
concept holds that poll results should determine which acts are microaggressions.
While “focus groups” and similar methods are sometimes used to determine which
kinds of acts should be regarded as microaggressions (e.g. the use of Consensual 
Qualitative Research methods in Nadal et al. 2015), researchers do not assume that
intersubjective agreement among participants is a criterion for being a microaggression. 
Rather, “focus group” methods are generally employed as techniques for discovering
new varieties of microaggression while minimizing the role of researcher biases (see e.g.
Nadal et al. 2015, 150–151).
Furthermore, as we argue below, there is no a priori reason to regard
microaggressions as alethically subjective. Regarding explanatory microaggressions, it
is an open empirical question whether outcome gaps are explained by perceived
microaggressions or by microaggressions regardless of how they are perceived by their
targets (i.e. microaggressions ascribed according to an alethically subjective or objective
    
       
   
    
 
            
             
        
           
         
           
            
               
                
  
          
           
            
           
       
        
           
 
         
           
         
       
          
  
               
         
       
             
        
           
             
7MICROAGGRESSIONS AND OBJECTIVITY
criterion), or by some other factor. Regarding hermeneutical microaggressions, the
concept fails to serve as an adequate hermeneutical resource unless microaggressions
are regarded as objective.
4. Explanatory microaggressions: measures and constructs. Lilienfeld
observes that most microaggression studies rely on self-report measures, and takes this
to be a consequence of the fact that microaggressions are alethically subjective (2017,
151). For example, many studies of microaggressions against African Americans use an
instrument called the Daily Life Experiences (DLE) scale (e.g. Scott 2003; Seaton et al.
2009; Torres et al. 2010), developed by Jules Harrell. Te instrument consists of 17–20
items describing discriminatory experiences, such as “overhearing or being told an
offensive joke” or “being lef out of conversations or activities” (from Seaton et al.). 
Study participants rate how ofen they have each kind of experience on a scale from
“never in the past year” to “once a week or more.” Teir responses are analyzed (in
various ways, depending on the study) to obtain a quantity representing how ofen 
participants experience racial microaggressions. Te DLE scale is a so-called “self-
report” or “subjective” measure, since study participants more or less transparently
report information in which experimenters are interested for its own sake (in contrast 
to behavioral measures or other indirect measures). Self-report measures are common
in psychological research on “subjective” constructs like subjective well-being
(Alexandrova 2008) or conscious visual experience (Boone 2013), where a “construct”
in psychology is a theoretical term whose quantity can be measured (Stone 2019, 1250
n2).
However, the connection between subjective constructs and so-called “subjective
measures” is not straightforward. An experimental measure will generally differ from
its associated construct in various ways. For example, a Stroop test may be administered
as a measure of cognitive depletion (as in e.g. Richeson and Trawalter 2005). But Stroop
performance is a temporal measure (a relative delay, measured in milliseconds) whereas
cognitive depletion is theoretically something more abstract: it may manifest as a 
temporal delay or as poorer performance or in various other ways. So here a temporal
measure is used to approximate, for the purposes of experimental analysis, the quantity
of a more abstract construct of interest (cognitive depletion).
More to the current point, self-report measures may be used to gather information
about constructs whose values are alethically objective. Consider, for example, the 
Perceptual Awareness Scale (PAS), a graded measure of visual awareness (Ramsøy and
Overgaard 2004). Study participants are briefy shown an image (ofen for less than 250
        
   
                
        
                 
             
             
            
             
                 
                
        
   
    
                 
             
        
            
           
            
          
         
              
       
            
         
   
            
            
    
              
           
             
   
           
           
               
8 MIKIO AKAGI AND FREDERICK W. GOODING, JR.
ms) and asked to classify their visual experience as “Clear Image,” “Almost Clear Image,” 
Weak Glimpse,” or “Not Seen.” One may think that this is a subjective measure for a 
subjective construct, since visual experience is ofen said to be “subjective,” but alethic
subjectivity is a property of claims so we must be precise about what claim is at issue.
Visual experience is subjective in that the content of two visual experiences may differ
for various judges (or one judge at different times) although those experiences are of
the same object in the same conditions. We ofen characterize the contents of such
experiences using clauses with “seem” or “look” as the main verb, and such clauses are
alethically subjective. A dress may look blue to Ali and at the same time look white (i.e.
not-blue) to Leah; the truth value of an utterance like “Tis dress looks blue” may vary
depending on the judge. But the PAS does not measure what the content of a visual
experience is; the PAS measures whether a visual experience of a stimulus occurred for 
a particular observer, and how clear that experience was. Tis is an alethically objective 
state of affairs. Te truth value of “Ali had a clear visual experience of the stimulus” does
not vary according to who evaluates it. If Ali and Leah disagree about the truth of such 
a sentence, then one of them must be wrong (and it’s probably not Ali).
Similarly, instruments like the DLE scale, which purport to reveal rates of
microaggression incidence in a participant’s life through self-report, may be fallible
measures of an alethically objective quantity. We say “may” because much extant
microaggression research does not distinguish clearly between alethically objective and
subjective interpretations of microaggression incidence. Instruments like the DLE scale
may be used either to measure the frequency of a participant’s exposure to demeaning
incidents (an alethically objective quantity), or to measure the participant’s perception
of how ofen she experiences demeaning incidents (an alethically subjective quantity).
Microaggressions in the explanatory sense are some factor that explains recalcitrant
gaps in desirable outcomes between members of privileged and oppressed social groups,
such as those that remain afer other factors like wealth, income, and legal
discrimination are accounted for. It is an open question whether this factor is (1) mere
exposure to demeaning incidents, regardless of how they are perceived by their targets,
or (2) the perception of one’s experiences as demeaning, or (3) something else. Tat is,
it is an open empirical question whether explanatory microaggressions are alethically
objective or subjective. Further empirical study is needed to assess the relative merits
of these hypotheses.
As a matter of verbal hygiene, it seems reasonable to us to treat explanatory
microaggressions as alethically objective, and then to examine whether outcome gaps
are caused by exposure to microaggressions per se or by the perception of events as
    
            
             
                 
            
         
             
              
             
            
                 
                
          
            
      
        
           
          
         
          
         
      
           
      
             
               
       
               
           
 
           
          
               
             
          
9MICROAGGRESSIONS AND OBJECTIVITY
microaggressions. By analogy, the standard for whether an act is a sexual assault is not
whether the survivor characterizes the act as “sexual assault” or even as harmful. But
the matter of which way to speak can only be settled by the community of speakers (in
this case, the community of social and behavioral scientists), not by fat, and it seems to
us that the matter has not yet been settled.
We wish to be clear that microaggression research employs a variety of methods 
that vary in quality and purpose; the DLE scale is only one instrument among many.
Our main objective here is not to conduct a methodological review (for which see e.g.
Okazaki 2009; Lau and Williams 2010; Wong et al. 2014), but to argue against a
tempting error. It is simplistic to identify a construct with its measure, and it is an error
to freely attribute the properties of a measure to its associated construct. So while it is
true that microaggression frequency is ofen measured using participant self-reports,
we should not infer from this fact that microaggression incidence is alethically
subjective. Existing measurement practices do not settle the question of whether 
microaggressions are “in the eye of the beholder.”
5. Hermeneutical microaggressions: phenomenological considerations. 
Whereas it is an open question whether explanatory microaggressions are alethically
subjective, there is compelling reason to regard hermeneutical microaggressions as
alethically objective. Our argument depends on the commonly reported
phenomenology of microaggression targets. Members of oppressed groups ofen report
experiencing confusion and uncertainty about whether an act directed toward them is
a subtle expression of prejudice, or whether it is no different than an act that would have 
been directed toward a privileged person. Tis feature of microaggressions is
sometimes called “attributional ambiguity” (Crocker and Major 1989). For example, a
woman might be addressed at work by her frst name (e.g. “Stephanie”) rather than by 
her title and surname (say, “Dr. Appiah”). In a context where either form of address is 
acceptable, and where the base rates are not known (i.e. it is not known how ofen
people in general, or people of various genders, are addressed by their frst names vs.
by their titles and surnames), it can be difficult to determine whether the address
expresses a slight.
Here is an argument that we should consider hermeneutical microaggressions to
be alethically objective. Supposing the contrary, that microaggressions are alethically
subjective, there are two possibilities. First, perhaps, as in many matters of taste, it is
appropriate to allow everyone their own perspective. So whoever feels the act of
addressing the woman by her frst name was a gendered slight regards it as a
        
            
          
          
           
            
              
             
               
              
 
             
         
            
               
          
          
          
              
         
        
            
  
     
           
 
            
   
     
             
             
        
        
          
10 MIKIO AKAGI AND FREDERICK W. GOODING, JR.
microaggression, and whoever feels the form of address was not infuenced by gender
does not regard it as a microaggression. If microaggressions are alethically subjective,
as we are currently supposing, then there is no perspective-independent fact of the
matter about whether this incident is a microaggression (as in predications of “is tasty”
or “looks blue-ish to me”). A second possibility is that people have their own
perspectives but the target’s perspective is decisive: the act is a microaggression if and
only if the addressed woman feels slighted. In both of these possibilities, it makes no
sense for the woman to wonder whether the act was really an expression of prejudice,
i.e. whether it was really a microaggression. On the frst option, there is no fact of the
matter about whether the act was a microaggression. On the second option, the matter
is decided by the woman’s own perspective, so her judgment settles the question.
However, people who experience relatively subtle microaggressions ofen report
wondering precisely about this. Indeed, it is ofen claimed (e.g. by Sue et al. 2007; Bartky 
1975; Du Bois 1903 and others) that much of the harm of microaggressions is caused
precisely by anxiety and paranoia regarding one’s inability to quickly and accurately
assess whether an act was indeed a microaggression. Only the objectivist view of 
microaggressions accounts for this phenomenology. If we seek hermeneutical justice,
we have reason to adopt concepts that make sense of rather than obscure common
experiences for members of oppressed social groups (Fricker 2007). So we should
regard microaggressions as objective, in that there are perspective-independent facts 
about whether particular acts or states of affairs are microaggressions in the
hermeneutical sense.
6. Conclusion. We argued, against the common view, that microaggressions should 
not be regarded as alethically subjective. For microaggressions in the hermeneutical
sense—considered as a category of items that help members of oppressed social groups 
to make sense of their lived experience—we argue that only an objectivist view
rationalizes the distress commonly experienced due to attributional ambiguity. For 
microggressions in the explanatory sense—considered as the causes of recalcitrant
outcome gaps—we acknowledge that it is an open question whether they are best
regarded as alethically objective or subjective. But we argued against a tempting view,
expressed by Lilienfeld and others, that self-report measures are especially suited for
measuring the value of theoretical constructs that are alethically subjective. People will
continue to question whether particular acts or states of affairs count as
    
         
 
          
    
          
           
          
            
    
         
      
             
         
         
             
           
 
            
         
          
         
        
            
       
         
              
        
 
           
  
               
      
          
 
 
         
             
         
     
            
            
 
MICROAGGRESSIONS AND OBJECTIVITY 11
microaggressions, and we contend that those questions have objectively accurate 
responses.
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